The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is
seeking proposals for its Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics
Defense (SHIELD) program. SHEILD aims to
develop a small (100 micron x 100 micron) component, or dielet, to authenticate
the provenance of electronics components.
As envisioned, SHIELD technology would provide 100 percent
assurance against these common threats to electronic components:
- Recycled
components that are sold as new
- Unlicensed
overproduction of authorized components
- Test
rejects and sub-standard components sold as high-quality
- Parts
marked with falsely elevated reliability or newer date of manufacture
- Clones
and copies, which may be of low quality, or may include hidden
functionality
- Components
that are covertly repackaged for unauthorized applications
As described on the DARPA website (http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2014/02/24.aspx),
the proposed dielets would “contain a full encryption engine, sensors to detect
tampering and would readily affix to today’s electronic components such as
microchips. The dielet will be inserted into the electronic component’s package
at the manufacturing site or affixed to existing trusted components, without
any alteration of the host component’s design or reliability. There is no
electrical connection between the dielet and the host component.”
I like the concept of a
dielet being inserted into the electronic components package or attached onto
the existing component without any alteration of the current design of the
component.
DARPA’s proposed SHIELD program is not enough on its own. I
do strongly suggest the continuance of implementing a robust counterfeit
detection test strategy as well as a plan to register the product and associated
serial numbers. These combined steps are
necessary to alert the manufacturer when there is a counterfeit device out in
the market.