DNA Marking Technologies

DNA testing is so commonplace on TV, if not in real life, that we are used to the idea that DNA testing can be used to unequivocally identify a person from the tiniest bit of genetic material. In today’s world it is only a small leap forward to suggest that we could identify manufactured parts using DNA marking.

Two DNA marking technologies are emerging for electronic components. One pioneered by the College of Nanoscale Science and Engineering (CNSE) of the University at Albany and Long Island-based Applied DNA Sciences, Inc, involves injecting plant DNA into electronic components during manufacturing. The other approach relies on the unique properties found in the silicon used in the chips. This approach is known as Hardware Intrinsic Security (HIS) and revolves around Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) technology, It is being developed by members of the HIS consortium including Intrinsic-ID BV, Cisco Systems, TSMC, NXP, Microsemi, IMEC, MIPS, SiVenture and Renesas.

DNA testing of electronic components is likely to become an exciting new tool to combat counterfeit electronic components. It makes a nice fit with existing testing methods for counterfeit components.

For more information about both approaches to DNA marking of electronic components see: http://www.ttiinc.com/object/me-slovick-20120222.html.

Electronic Components May Contain Cyberspying Threat

Even “legitimate” electronic components made in China and other countries may contain dangerous surprises.  There is growing concern that such components may include the hidden ability to spy on US telecom and computer network data.

According to a Bloomberg report, the Obama administration is pressing US telecom companies to reveal information about such possible electronic espionage attempts.  The government is using Cold War powers to pressure companies to provide the information.

“This is beyond vague suspicions,” said Richard Falkenrath, a senior fellow in the Council on Foreign Relations Cyberconflict and Cybersecurity Initiative. “Congress is now looking at this as well, and they’re doing so based on very specific material provided them in a classified setting by the National Security Agency,” he said.

This is a growing area of concern. Watch for additional and widening investigations.  Now we test electronic components to ensure that they do what is expected of them. Soon we may be testing them to make sure they only do what is expected, with no hidden functions or capabilities. 

SIA President Testifies on Dangers of Counterfeit Chips

The president of  the  Semiconductor Industry Association recently testified before Congress on the dangers and costs of counterfeit electronic components.

“The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril. A counterfeit semiconductor is a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey,  the president of the Semiconductor Industry Association told the Senate Armed Services Committee, which is investigating counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense supply chain.

“Counterfeiters violate American companies’ intellectual property rights and cost American’s jobs. We estimate that counterfeiting costs US-based semiconductor companies more than $7.5 billion each year.
For more information on Toohey’s testimony before the Senate committee see:  SIA President Testifies on Dangers of Counterfeit Chips

Discussions on Proper Electrical Testing of Components at the DMSMS 2011 Conference

A major concern at the recently concluded DMSMS conference was the US Department of Defense potential cutback of electrical testing of electronic components.

The Military and Aerospace industry attendees and exhibitors had major concerns about the limited testing performed by a curve/contact tester versus the preferred DC, AC, functional and parametric testing of a device.  The preferred tests are important in uncovering counterfeit products.

I gave a lecture at the conference entitled “Proper Electrical Testing to Detect Counterfeit Components.”  Its scope was to educate members of the electronics industry about the risks associated with performing only basic contact testing with simple counterfeit detectors as opposed to the preferred functional and parametric exercises required to properly test these suspect electronic components.  Electrical testing provides a more thorough exercise in testing electronic component products to illustrate their accuracy and authenticity.

As exhibitors at the recent DMSMS conference, NJMET presented our Mission: Imposter Counterfeit Component Test Program. The team at NJMET participated in the Counterfeit Parts Control Plan Implementations, the DMSMS Tools and Services Program, as well as technical sessions and panels which included: Institutionalizing Standard Practices, Defense Initiatives and Their Impact to DMSMS, Counterfeit Mitigation Strategies, and Counterfeit Reporting.

For more about the DMSMS conference see “Joseph Federico talks on proper electrical testing at the DMSMS and Standardization Conference 2011.”

The Purpose of Electronic Testing

Here’s a link to a great layman’s level explanation of the purpose of electronic testing: 

The Different Kinds of Electronic Testing Equipment    I would like to add that in the event of a suspected electronic failure, it would be wise to send the suspect electronic component to an electronic component test laboratory to evaluate the component.   Continuing to use a malfunctioning component can cause massive damage to the entire electrical device.

Thoughts on the JEDEC Standard Update

I feel that the new JESD9B document presents a good structure for external visual inspection of electronic microcircuits covering a wide range of commercial off-the-shelf products manufactured in the plastics arena.  This arena is much more significant to manufacturers today than in 1994, which was the peak time for the Mil-Std-883 Method 2009 which covered only hermetically sealed components.

This updated specification is long overdue and a useful method, combining old and new industry criteria for proper external visual inspection protocols.

Detecting Counterfeit Electronic Components

This opinion piece at CBSNews.com raises the issue of counterfeit components originating in China.

Nearly a decade ago our company NJ Micro Electronic Testing began uncovering non-authentic electronic component products that had been purchased for use in Defense Department equipment as well as in the medical and other industrial arenas. These counterfeit components had a varying level of sophistication, but they all failed when tested against the military standards the real parts needed to meet or exceed. As a response, we devised a state of the art, military standards-based testing program to detect and stop the flow of counterfeit electronic component devices called "Mission Imposter®". It is the world's first counterfeit component detection program. This testing process detects counterfeit electronics before they find their way into a customer's products.

The Mission Imposter process begins with an analysis of the shipping materials and packaging. The parts then undergo several levels of inspection including: marking and dimensional checks, internal visual analysis, several levels of material analysis, and electrical testing to determine authenticity.

The successful implementation of this program has been effective in uncovering imitation electronic devices that began infiltrating the industry close to a decade ago. These counterfeit components can now be detected and stopped. It's important that this happens before they are used in the manufacture of products that could put many projects and many lives in danger.